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INTRODUCTION 
This article will focus on the state of legal accountability in the relation 
between the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) and the European Central 
Bank (“ECB”) as developed after the unfolding of the so-called Euro Crisis. 
The underlying hypothesis behind this analysis is twofold: the 2008 crisis has 
marked a remarkable change in the constitutional balance of the Eurozone, 
and as a consequence the constitutional function of the ECB has emerged and 
become visible.  
To detect these changes, three cases will be discussed in order to show 
that there has been a shift in the ECJ’s interpretation of the Treaty on the 
European Union (“TEU”) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (“TFEU”) (“the Treaties”)1 and, accordingly, of the role of the ECB. 
The reaction to the Euro crisis has shown that the ECB cannot be deemed to 
be only an administrative independent agency, but it should be treated as an 
organ with constitutional functions, whose role has systemic implications for 
the stability of the European Union itself.2 Such recognition implies that the 
ECB’s decisions ought to be treated not only procedurally, but in a genuinely 
political and constitutional way.  
  
 * Senior Lecturer, University of Glasgow School of Law. This paper was prepared for and first 
presented at the 8th Annual Transatlantic Law Forum, hosted by the Law & Economics Center at George 
Mason University. The research for this article has been generously supported by subsidies for long-term 
conceptual development of the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Re-
public, v.v.i. (RVO: 68378122). 
 1 The Lisbon Treaty is the most recent rationalisation of the treaties that make up the European 
Union. European integration has been marked by a number of different treaties, which have been reduced 
to two. Unlike the previous structure of the Union, both treaties refer to the same legal subject. The “di-
vision into two European Treaties follows a functional criterion. While the (new) Treaty on the European 
Union contains the general provisions defining the Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union spells out specific provisions with regard to the Union institutions and politicies.” ROBERT 
SCHÜTZE, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 37 (2015). For the sake of clarity, two points ought to be mentioned at 
the outset of this article: first, sometimes this article references the EC Treaty, which preceded the Lisbon 
Treaty. This is the case because some institutions and rules were already created by that Treaty. Second, 
other treaties have been recently approved in the wake of the Euro crisis, such as the European Stability 
Mechanism and the so-called Fiscal Compact. Neither are part of EU law, but they do apply to European 
institutions in certain circumstances. 
 2 See infra notes 48–56 and accompanying text. 
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In a nutshell, the article pleads, first, for the recognition of the limits of 
legal accountability3 before the power-grabbing of the ECB and, second, for 
the opening of a constitutional discussion on the function of central banking. 
In order to prove this point, the next section explains why, in the context of 
the EU, and in particular after the 2008 crisis, the ECB has become an organ 
with a share in the European governing function. Hence, in the following 
three sections, the trajectory of the case law related to that role is illustrated 
and the limits of judicial review exposed. The last section briefly assesses the 
timid attitude of the ECJ before the ECB and mentions why this is a consti-
tutional question. If the diagnosis is correct, then the prognosis is that a com-
pensation scheme in the European balance of power with more political ac-
countability of central banking will have to be introduced. 
I. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK IN THE EURO 
GOVERNANCE 
The rise of central banks as independent administrative agencies is un-
deniable and is the outcome of a revolutionary transformation in the concep-
tion of the constitutional organization of monetary and economic policies.4 
Until the end of the seventies, in the Western world, there were only a few 
fully independent and autonomous central banks, the Bundesbank among 
them, for obvious historical reasons.5 But in order to cope with the increasing 
demand for a non-political government of monetary policy, and in the wake 
of the revival of monetarism, many Western states decided to disentangle 
their central banks from the relevant minister (usually, the treasury).6  
The ECB is quintessentially a product, if not the epitome, of this wide-
spread constitutional transformation. But, compared to other central banks, it 
operates in a rather different constitutional environment and on the basis of 
some different assumptions.7 The ECB is designed as a highly independent 
  
 3 On the difference between legal and political accountability, see Mark Bovens, Analysing and 
Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework, 13 EUR. L.J. 447, 445–46 (2007).  
 4 Sam Y. Cross, Following the Bundesbank: The Spread of Central Bank Independence, 73 
FOREIGN AFF. 128, 128–29, 131 (1994) (reviewing DAVID MARSH, THE MOST POWERFUL BANK: INSIDE 
GERMANY’S BUNDESBANK (1993)). 
 5 The control of inflation was deemed to be essential in order to avoid the rise of extremist political 
parties. The experience of the failure of the Weimar republic had suggested the detachment of monetary 
policy from governmental agencies, in favour of an autonomous and independent institution. See Chris-
topher Alessi, Germany’s Central Bank and the Eurozone, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://www.cfr.org/world/germanys-central-bank-eurozone/p29934. 
 6 See KAARLO TUORI & KLAUS TUORI, THE EUROZONE CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
222–23 (2014); Rosa Maria Lastra, The Independence of the European System of Central Banks, 33 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 475, 477–78, 487–88 (1992) [hereinafter Lastra, Independence of European Central Banks]. 
 7 Rosa M. Lastra, The Evolution of the European Central Bank, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1260, 
1260 (2012) [hereinafter Lastra, Evolution of the European Central Bank]. 
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EU agency with a legal basis and detailed statutes on the level of the Treaties 
since the age of Maastricht.8 In theory, it operates like an administrative au-
thority whose primary entrenched objective is price stability,9 but it is em-
bedded in a wider constitutional framework which bestows upon it other im-
portant functions.10 Its independence is explicitly recognised by the TFEU:  
When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon 
them by the Treaties and the Statute of the [European System of Central Banks] and 
of the [ECB], neither the [ECB], nor a national central bank, nor any member of 
their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Union institutions, 
bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any 
other body.11  
The classic argument in support of strong independence is based the 
belief that:  
central bankers, because of their specializations [and] relative insulation from polit-
ical pressures, are more prepared than politicians to pursue the objective of price 
stability than politicians. The skills, expertise and superior qualifications of central 
bankers compared to politicians recommend an independent central bank, . . . which 
may better guarantee a more objective, more “neutral” and faster decision-making 
process.12  
Legally, the argument is based on the recognition that the creation and regu-
lation of the ECB’s activities was not delegated to EU legislation—in which 
case, the ECB would have been a creature of statute—but directly by the 
Treaties and its protocols.13 The ECB’s independence is also strengthened by 
another material factor: only the national central banks subscribe to its capi-
tal, and the ECB derives its revenues solely through its own monetary oper-
ations or through those of the national central banks operating within the Eu-
ropean System of Central Banks (“ESCB”).14 Financially, the ECB does not 
depend on any other EU institutions. Even the status of its staff enjoys a re-
markable independence when compared to other institutions.15 
  
 8 Id. at 1260–61; see also RENÉ SMITS, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK IN THE EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 5–6 (2003). 
 9 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 127(1), May 
9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].  
 10 See Lastra, Independence of European Central Banks, supra note 7 at 1262–74 (describing the 
objectives and functions of the ECB). 
 11 TFEU art. 130. 
 12 Lastra, Independence of European Central Banks, supra note 6, at 477. 
 13 See TUORI & TUORI, supra note 6, at 223; CHIARA ZILIOLI & MARTIN SELMAYR, THE LAW OF 
THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 32–33 (2001). 
 14 See Independence, EUR. CENT. BANK (last visited Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ 
ecb/orga/independence/html/index.en.html. 
 15 See TFEU art. 130. 
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The ECB’s independence is explicitly recognised by the Treaties not 
only because of its competence, but also in a way functional to the realization 
of the Economic and Monetary Union (“EMU”) as a currency union without 
federal devices of transfer or compensation schemes.16 In fact, the ECB inde-
pendence from political pressure is basically necessary in order to maintain 
the separation between monetary policy, whose management is by now fully 
supranational, obviously only in the Eurozone, and economic policy, which 
is still driven by intergovernmental logic.17 The underlying argument is that 
the jurisdiction of an independent Central Bank ensures a coherent monetary 
policy not exposed to the pressure of short-term political interests.18 Func-
tionally, the constitutional role of the ECB is made possible by the expertise 
of its members, which plays a key role when it comes to highly technical 
decisions on complicated questions of monetary policy.19 As a consequence 
of this setting, the ECB is isolated from any type of input legitimacy.20 Its 
credentials depend on its capacity to deliver outputs in a way that is credible 
and independent from stakeholders and politicians.21 The nature of this inde-
pendence was not clear until the Euro entered Circulation.22 Some authors 
actually went as far as stating that the ECB and the ECSB enjoy an intrinsi-
cally autonomous constitutional status: essentially, a new supranational or-
ganization within the European Union.23 Given the expertise of the authors 
and the robust tradition of respect for central bank autonomy among academ-
ics, this position enjoyed considerable respect.24 
The provisions not only circumscribe the objectives of monetary policy 
but also the instruments to pursue it to great detail. Following the logic of a 
currency union overseen by a technical body, the governance of the Euro is 
presented in the Treaties as being rule-based, which explains the amount of 
detailed regulation around monetary policy.25 This is not only the outcome of 
  
 16 See How Economic and Monetary Union Works, EUR. COMM’N (last visited Feb. 24, 2017), 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/emu/how/index_en.htm; see also DAVID HOWARTH & PETER 
LOEDEL THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK: THE NEW EUROPEAN LEVIATHAN? 17–19 (2d ed. 2005).  
 17 See René Smits, The European Central Bank’s Independence and Its Relations with Economic 
Policy Makers, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1614, 1614–18 (2008). 
 18 Lastra, Independence of European Central Banks, supra note 6, at 477–78. 
 19 TUORI & TUORI, supra note 6, at 30–31, 221–25 (explaining the rationales of the division between 
monetary and economic policy: one technical, one political).  
 20 Andrew Glencross, Democratic Inputs Versus Output-Oriented Governance: The ECB’s Evolv-
ing Role and the New Architecture of Legitimacy in the EU, 5 J. INT’L ORGS. STUDS. 23, 24 (2014); see 
also FRITZ W. SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC? 6–11 (1999) (describing 
the distinction between input and output legitimacy). 
 21 Glencross, supra note 20, at 25–26. 
 22 See id. at 24. 
 23 See, e.g., ZILIOLI & SELMAYR, supra note 13, at 29–35. 
 24 See SMITS, supra note 8, at 11 (explaining that Zilioli and Selmayr’s view is one of the two main 
views of the ECB). 
 25 ALICIA HINAREJOS, THE EURO AREA CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 18–19 (2015). 
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the concern of Germany, the Eurozone’s reluctant hegemon: in fact, Ger-
many feared that a relaxed fiscal policy of Southern Member States might 
have burdened, in the longer term, German savers. But this approach is also 
a way to ensure that the Euro governance’s mechanisms, being managed ac-
cording to rules, maintain a neutral character and remain within the realm of 
the rule of law.26 Otherwise, the whole project of the common currency would 
not be capable of generating a sufficient amount of mutual trust among the 
participating EU member states (“Member States”) and it would collapse, 
eventually generating financial burdens for all Member States and in partic-
ular for those in the position of creditors.27  
On a comparative note, such a strong constitutional definition of the 
principle of independence is rather exceptional. As already noted by Francis 
Snyder, the ECB enjoys “greater independence than the U.S. Federal Reserve 
Board and virtually all central banks prior to the Monetary Union.”28 The 
U.S. Federal Reserve Board “does not enjoy constitutional status and, alt-
hough it enjoys great independence by custom, nothing prevents Congress 
from adopting legislation mandating certain goals or policies . . . .”29 Con-
gress has rarely exercised  this power, but nonetheless knows it can resort to 
in extreme circumstances.30 In Europe, both the Bank of England and the 
Netherlands Central Bank were renowned for their efficacious monetary con-
trol, even though each bank’s functional independence was largely custom-
based, and could by bound by instructions from the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer or the Ministry of Finance.31  
Contrary to the previous example, it is key to note that, in the context of 
the Eurozone, the construction of the single currency provided the ECB with 
a de facto governing power.32 Kenneth Dyson, in a prescient way, has de-
tected the conditions which would make it possible for the ECB to become 
one of the key players in the Eurozone.33 He calls this outcome an “ECB-
Centric Eurozone.”34 Among the factors determining the rise of the ECB 
leadership the following should be mentioned: “A dominant economic policy 
paradigm of sound money and finance . . . an ‘asymmetric’ [Economic and 
  
 26 See OTMAR ISSING, THE BIRTH OF THE EURO 191–94 (Nigel Hulbert trans., 2008). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Roger J. Goebel, Court of Justice Oversight Over the European Central Bank: Delimiting the 
ECB’s Constitutional Autonomy and Independence in the OLAF Judgment, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 610, 
621 (2006) (citing Frances Snyder, EMU—Metaphor for European Union? Institutions, Rules and Types 
of Regulation, in EUROPE AFTER MAASTRICHT 63, 78 (Renaud Dehousse ed., 1994)). 
 29 Id. 
 30 See id.  
 31 Id. 
 32 See ZILIOLI & SELMAYR, supra note 13, at 25–35 (contrasting the ECB’s power and independ-
ence with that of other national banks and EU institutions). 
 33 See KENNETH DYSON, THE POLITICS OF THE EUROZONE: STABILITY OR BREAKDOWN? 11–12 
(2000). 
 34 Id. at 12. 
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Monetary Union] . . . the predominance of ‘negative’ over ‘positive’ integra-
tion . . .  and the issue of regime compatibility. . . .”35  
The asymmetric character of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(“EMU”) has been explained as a necessary device in order to cope with pris-
oner’s dilemma issues affecting the interaction among Member States.36 The 
core issue, in the case of the Euro, was that “of inducing credibility in others 
of one’s commitment to the policy to be agreed to avoid defection from a 
mutually beneficial agreement.”37 Because democratic competition works to 
create deficit financing, thereby undermining the long-term stability of the 
currency and public finances, it was thought that the Euro was designed to 
avoid forms of strong political accountability in the governance of the single 
currency.38 Key for this conclusion is the idea that the source of the Euro-
zone’s distinctive character is its two-level nature: the EU and national levels 
are at once separate and interacting.39 This means that in terms of the govern-
ance of the Euro, the formal monopoly is in the hands of Euro-institutions—
mostly, the ECB and the European Commission (“EC”)—with no formal de-
cision-making power left to the national level; yet, the decisions taken at the 
supranational level massively impact massively not only on the policies at 
the national level, but also on the fabric of national constitutions.40 The risk 
is that the stabilizing force of the Euro is limited to the goal of price stability, 
but at the expense of the solidity of Member States’ political systems.41 
In addition to the previous factors, one has to bear in mind the legal 
distinction between monetary and economic policies. In fact, even if it were 
possible to postulate that monetary and economic policies can play out sepa-
rately in distinct channels—and this remain a debatable issue42—the ECB 
  
 35 Id. at 11. 
 36 Richard Bellamy & Albert Weale, Political Legitimacy and European Monetary Union: Con-
tracts, Constitutionalism and the Normative Logic of Two-Level Games, 22 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 257, 261–
62 (2015). 
 37 Id. at 261. 
 38 Id. at 261–62 (citing ISSING, supra note 26, at 234–36). 
 39 Id. at 259, 263; see also How the European Union Works, EUR. UNION 3 (2012), http://eeas.eu-
ropa.eu/archives/delegations/singapore/documents/more_info/eu_publications/how_the_european_un-
ion_works_en.pdf. 
 40 Bellamy & Weale, supra note 36, at 262, 270; see also François Heisbourg, The EU Without the 
Euro, SURVIVAL GLOBAL POL. & STRATEGY, April/May 2014, at 27, 28–29; How Economic and Mone-
tary Union Works, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/emu/how/index 
_en.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2017) (describing the rationale for maintaining closely coordinated, central-
ized and independent monetary control and the importance that member states coordinate economic and 
fiscal policies with common stability and growth objectives). 
 41 See, e.g., Heisbourg, supra note 40, at 28–29; Paul De Grauwe, Design Failures of the Eurozone, 
VOX (Sept. 7, 2015), http://voxeu.org/article/design-failures-eurozone. 
 42 Compare Hugo Dixon, Can Europe’s Divided House Stand?: Separating Fiscal and Monetary 
Union, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 2011, at 74, 74–76, with Ralph S. Musgrave, Monetary and Fiscal Pol-
icy Should be Merged, Which in Turn Changes the Role of Central Banks, 1–3 (Munich Pers. RePEc 
Archive, Paper No. 30521, 2011), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30521/1/MPRA_paper_30521.pdf. 
2017] LIMITS OF LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE EBC 601 
would still be in charge of determining the amount of credit to which the 
Member State and its banking system have access.43 The special position of 
the ECB—that is, it is beyond outside any clear State framework44—gives to 
this institution an impact upon other European and Member States’ institu-
tions that is quite extraordinary in nature.45 One has to bear in mind that, even 
in the case of a Member State with an independent central bank, the main 
objectives are usually set by other institutions with more solid representative 
credentials.46 In this way, as was shown during the Greek crisis, the decisions 
of the ECB, for example, on liquidity, do shape, albeit indirectly, the policies 
of Member States.47 
The new economic governance of the Euro has partially mutated and 
actually enhanced the role of the ECB in the constitutional framework of the 
Eurozone.48 The ECB is actively involved in the European Stability Mecha-
nism (“ESM”) as a member of the supervision team over the Member State’s 
fiscal and financial policies to be implemented in compliance with condi-
tions.49 The latter are a series of financial and economic constraints that apply 
to the Member State once its request to use the resources offered by the ESM 
is accepted. The rationale is that a loan is offered to the Member State in 
financial difficulty, but in order to avoid moral hazard, strict financial condi-
tions are imposed upon its public spending. This new role entails that the 
ECB, together with the Commission and the International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”), and outside the framework of EU law, co-dictates certain policies 
and then supervises their application by the Member State subject to the pro-
gram.50 Furthermore, the ECB has been given new tasks of supervision in the 
recently enacted European Banking Union.51 In a nutshell, as an organ (the 
  
 43 See, e.g., David McHugh, ECB Restores Bond Waiver, Lets Greek Banks Tap Credit, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 22, 2016), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1ddb37c548c84e0391df8cec 
02b49e0a/ecb-restores-bond-waiver-lets-greek-banks-tap-credit; Landon Thomas, Jr., European Central 
Bank Squeezes Greek Banks, Tightening Access to Loans, N.Y. TIMES (April 21, 2015), http://www.ny-
times.com/2015/04/22/business/dealbook/ecb-tightens-flow-of-money-to-greek-banks.html?_r=0.  
 44 Christoph S. Weber & Benedikt Forschner, ECB: Independence at Risk?, 49 INTERECONOMICS 
45, 48 (2014). 
 45 See, e.g., R.A., The Euro Crisis: Rule by Technocracy, THE ECONOMIST: FREE EXCHANGE (Nov. 
17, 2011, 4:28 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/11/euro-crisis-13; Simon 
Nixon, The ECB Power Base Grows Ever Stronger, WALL ST. J. (EUR. ED.) (Feb. 27, 2012).  
 46 See Smits, supra note 17, at 1625; David S. D’Amato, How Independent are Central Banks?, 
INST. ECON. AFF. (May 31, 2013), https://iea.org.uk/blog/how-independent-are-central-banks.  
 47 See Nixon, supra note 45.  
 48 See generally Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Feb. 2, 2012, T/ESM 2012-
LT/en 1, http://www.esm.europa.eu/about/legal-documents/ESM%20 Treaty.htm [hereinafter ESM 
Treaty].  
 49 Id. art. 5.  
 50 Id. art. 13. 
 51 Bernd Krauskopf, et al., Some Critical Aspects of the European Banking Union, 29 BANKING & 
FIN. L. REV. 241, 242–44 (2014); Understanding . . . Banking Union, EUR. COMM’N: BANKING & FIN. 
NEWSLETTER 2 (Feb. 27, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/fisma/itemdetail.cfm?item_ 
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ECB) and as a function (as central banking), the ECB co-determines the po-
litical direction of the Eurozone.52 In constitutional parlance, this means that 
the ECB performs a governing function.53 As such, its status as a materially 
constitutional organ ought to be recognized and its political salience too. Un-
surprisingly, a series of suits provided the ECJ the chance to send a signal to 
the European political process that such a transformation ought to be dis-
cussed in and by the public.54 Unfortunately, the ECJ shied away and showed 
an unduly, yet predictable, deference toward the policies of the ECB.55 The 
outcome of the recent decisions is to strengthen the solidity of the emergency 
regime created to tackle the Euro crisis.56 Far from being temporary in nature, 
the enhanced role of the ECB will have to be addressed at the level of con-
stitutional design. 
II. OLAF: RESISTING THE POWER-GRABBING OF THE ECB 
The nature of the ECB’s independence, already subject to academic 
analysis,57 was tested in an influential case decided in 2003 by the ECJ, which 
addressed a confrontation between the European Commission and the ECB 
on the extent of powers of the newly instituted Office Lutte Anit-Fraud 
(“OLAF”).58 OLAF is the European Anti-Fraud Office; it was created in the 
aftermath of the resignation of the Santer’s Commission for corruption,59 with 
the task of examining all illegal activities which are detrimental to the EU 
  
id=20758&newsletter_id=166&utm_source=fisma_newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_cam-
paign=Finance%20&utm_content=Understanding...%20Banking%20Union&lang=en. 
 52 See René Smits, The Crisis Response in Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union: Overview of 
Legal Developments, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L J. 1135, 1175 (2015); The Politicisation of the European Cen-
tral Bank, EUROPEAN UNION CTR. OF THE UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL: EU BRIEFINGS (July 30, 2013), 
http://europe.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Brief1312-ecb.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2017); see 
also Nina Werkhäuser, DW Survey: Who Holds the Most Sway in the EU?, DW.COM (Aug. 24, 2015), 
http://www.dw.com/en/dw-survey-who-holds-the-most-sway-in-the-eu/a-18668061 (finding that 39% of 
those surveyed believed the ECB has the greatest influence on political direction in the EU).  
 53 Hans Keman, Constitutional Government in 1 GOV’T AND POL. 68, 69 (Masashi Sekiguchi ed., 
2009).  
 54 Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400 (E.C.J.); Case C-
370/12, Pringle v. Gov’t of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756 (E.C.J.). 
 55 Gauweiler, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, ¶¶ 55–56, 92, 127; Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012: 756, ¶¶ 60–
62, 154–165. 
 56 For a brilliant analysis of the long-term impact of the Euro emergency regime, see generally 
Jonathan White, Authority After Emergency Rule, 78 MODERN L. REV. 585 (2015).  
 57 For example, Fabian Amtenbrink has analysed the ECB’s independence under its institutional, 
functional, organizational and financial aspects. FABIAN AMTENBRINK, THE DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY OF CENTRAL BANKS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 18–
22 (1999). 
 58 Case C-11/00, Comm’n of the European Cmtys. v. European Cent. Bank, 2003 E.C.R. I-7147. 
 59 For a thorough description of the Santer’s Commission, see Adam Tomkins, Responsibility and 
Resignation in the European Commission, 62 MODERN L. REV. 744 (1999). 
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financial interests.60 Despite being formally part of the European Commis-
sion, it enjoys a high level of autonomy and independence.61 The case was 
seminal for several reasons, but one in particular must be highlighted for the 
purposes of this article. The ECB’s line of defense was based on the argument 
that the nature of its institutional independence was of a constitutional nature; 
hence, the protection of its autonomy and independence ought to be the high-
est.62  
Note that here the constitutional nature of the ECB’s independence 
meant legal entrenchment.63 The core of the ECB’s claim went so far as to 
state that it should not be deemed to be simply an organ within (what was 
then) the EC, and had a legal personality distinct from the EC.64 The idea, 
advocated by Zilioli and Selmayr, of an ECB as a supranational organization 
is usually based on the recognition of the legal source behind its creation.65 
In the case of the ECB, its institution and granting of powers and duties come 
from the Member States’ ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and not from 
ordinary Community legislation.66 The Maastricht Treaty would have sepa-
rated the position of the ECB not only in terms of its function, but even in 
terms of its full autonomy: “the ECB is also not institutionally linked to the 
Communities, . . . [and] it never acts as financial instrument of the Commu-
nity institutions or even for and on behalf of them . . . as this would be in-
compatible both with its independence and with its primary objective of price 
stability.”67 Moreover, the ECB budget, financial resources and expenses are 
totally autonomous, based upon grants of power under the EC Treaty or the 
Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and ECB.68 The ECB noted also that it 
was granted the right to independently set its internal organization procedures 
and staff rules, which would also include internal controls against fraud and 
corruption.69 In light of these points, and on a comparative scale, it is reason-
able to affirm that the ECB enjoys an autonomy and independence that go 
much further than any historical precedent.70  
  
 60 For an in-depth analysis of this body, see generally J.F.H. INGHELRAM, LEGAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN ANTI-FRAUD OFFICE (OLAF): AN ANALYSIS WITH A LOOK 
FORWARD TO A EUROPEAN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE (2011). 
 61 Goebel, supra note 28, at 629 (citing Commission Decision (EC) of 28 April 1999, Establishing 
the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 1999 O.J. (L 136) 20).  
 62 Case C-11/00, European Cent. Bank, 2003 E.C.R. at I-7246–48, 51–52. 
 63 Id. at I-7265–66.  
 64 See id. at I-7264; HANSPETER K. SCHELLER, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK: HISTORY, ROLE 
AND FUNCTIONS 43 (2004). 
 65 ZILIOLI & SELMAYR, supra note 13, at 12. 
 66 Id. at 30–31. 
 67 Id. at 30. 
 68 Id. at 29–31. 
 69 Case C-11/00, Comm’n of the European Cmtys. v. European Cent. Bank, 2003 E.C.R. I-7215, I-
7260. 
 70 ZILIOLI & SELMAYR, supra note 13, at 32–33. For academic reactions against this argument, see 
generally Fabian Amtenbrink & Jakob deHaan, The European Central Bank: An Independent Specialized 
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The question submitted to the Court concerned the ECB’s Decision 
1999/726,71 creating its own internal procedures to combat fraud. According 
to the Commission, this ECB decision violated the rules of Regulation 
1073/1999,72 which authorised OLAF to exercise its investigative powers in 
internal reviews of all EC institutions, agencies, and bodies.73 By delegating 
its own antifraud powers to an independent agency like OLAF, the Commis-
sion hoped to improve the fight against fraud, corruption and other illegal 
activities.74 The problem is that, from the perspective of the ECB, the latter 
autonomous status and effective functioning in shaping monetary policies, 
might be jeopardized if subjected to external (even though independent) in-
vestigations.75 As a matter of constitutional balance, the argument stated that 
the inter-institutional equilibrium among EU institutions would have been 
shaken in a negative way for the ECB in case of an “intrusion” by an admin-
istrative agency.76 On the basis of its claim of constitutional nature, the ECB 
maintained, against the Commission, that the regulation did not apply to it.77  
In adjudicating this inter-institutional conflict, an issue on which the 
Court has always proved to be particularly careful, the ECJ had to face the 
first attempt at power-grabbing by the ECB.78 The ECJ, in an assertive and 
non-deferential way, rejected the view that the ECB could be considered an 
autonomous order among other orders.79 The Advocate General rejected the 
arguments made by the ECB in his highly detailed opinion:  
The ECB is subject to the general principles of laws which form part of [EC] law 
and promotes the goals of the [EC] set out in Article 2 of the EC [as it was codified 
before the Lisbon Treaty] though the implementation of the tasks and duties laid 
upon it. It may therefore be described as the Central Bank of the [EC]; it would be 
inaccurate to characterise it, as have some writers, as an organization which is ‘in-
dependent of the [EC],’ a ‘Community within the Community,’ a ‘new Community,’ 
  
Organization of Community Law – A Comment, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 65 (2002); Ramon Torrent, 
Whom is the European Central Bank the Central Bank Of?: Reaction to Zilioli and Selmayr, 36 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 1229 (1999). 
 71 European Central Bank Decision No. 1999/726/EC, O.J. L 291, at 36 (1999). 
 72 Commission Regulation 1073/1999, Concerning Investigations conducted by the European Anti-
Fraud Office (OLAF) 1999 O.J. (L 136) 1 (E.C.).   
 73 Case C-11/00, European Cent. Bank, 2003 E.C.R. at I-7217, 7239–43; see also LIBER AMICORUM 
& PAOLO ZAMBONI GARAVELLI, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS 32–
33 (2005). 
 74 European Cent. Bank, 2003 E.C.R. at I-7223–24 (citing Commission Decision (E.C.) of 28 April 
1999, art. 2, 1999 O.J. (L 136/20) 21). 
 75 Id. at I-7259–60. 
 76 Id. at I-7276; see also Goebel, supra note 28, at 628. 
 77 European Cent. Bank, 2003 E.C.R. at I-7245–46. 
 78 Goebel, supra note 28, at 627 (2006). 
 79 European Cent. Bank, 2003 E.C.R. at  I-7265.  
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or, indeed, as something falling outside the notion of a body established by, or on 
the basis of, the EC Treaty in Regulation No. 1073/1999.80  
The Court followed the Advocate General’s opinion, stating that the 
ECB, by being created by the EC Treaty, was to be granted a high level of 
independence but should still be considered an organ of the EC and as such, 
to be subject to the OLAF regulation.81 The main justification behind this 
decision was determined by a functional interpretation of the ECB’s inde-
pendence:  
[T]he independence thus established is not an end in itself; it serves a specific pur-
pose. By shielding the decision-making process of the ECB from short-term political 
pressures the principle of independence aims to enable the ECB effectively to pursue 
the aim of price stability and, without prejudice to that aim, support the economic 
policies of the Community.82  
In other words, the Advocate General drew a functional boundary for the 
ECB’s independence: the interference with the ECB that the Treaty forbids 
is limited to those activities liable to undermine the ability of the ECB to 
deliver price stability.83 Beyond this realm, other interactions or reviews are 
actually legitimate.84 The ECJ followed the same line of reasoning, stating 
that the ECB’s independence is “strictly functional and is limited to the per-
formance of [its] specific tasks.”85 More specifically, the Court stated that the 
ECB’s independence did not mean complete absence of control over its ac-
tivities.86 In fact, “the ECB is, on the conditions laid down by the EC Treaty 
and the ESCB Statute, subject to various kinds of [EC] controls, notably re-
view by the Court of Justice and control by the Court of Auditors.”87 
  
 80 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-11/00, Comm’n of the European Cmtys. v. Euro-
pean Cent. Bank, 2003 E.C.R. I-7155, I-7175 (footnotes omitted). 
 81 European Cent. Bank, 2003 E.C.R. at I-7265; Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European 
Cent. Bank, 2003 E.C.R. at I-7202 (“As is evident . . . , the Treaty and the Statute confer upon the ECB a 
high level of independence which is equivalent to, or perhaps greater than, the independence of the na-
tional central banks which prevailed prior to the reforms undertaken at national level in order to comply 
with the requirements for entry into the Monetary Union. However, the principle of independence does 
not imply a total isolation from, or a complete absence of cooperation with, the institutions and bodies of 
the Community. The Treaty prohibits only influence which is liable to undermine the ability of the ECB 
to carry out its tasks effectively with a view to price stability, and which must therefore be regarded as 
undue.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 82 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Cent. Bank, 2003 E.C.R. at I-7200. 
 83 Id. at I-7202. Note that even the definition of price stability, absent from the Treaties, has been 
left to the ECB. The Definition of Price Stability, EUR. CENT. BANK, https://www.ecb. 
europa.eu/mopo/strategy/pricestab/html/index.en.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (explaining that the 
ECB’s Governing Council has defined price stability as “a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index 
of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area below 2%.”). 
 84 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Cent. Bank, 2003 E.C.R. at I-7202. 
 85 European Cent. Bank, 2003 E.C.R. at I-7263. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at I-7265. 
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In this decision, the ECJ basically rebutted the ECB’s attempt to expand 
its independence in a way completely unrelated to its functions.88 In this way, 
the ECJ defined both the nature of the ECB and its constitutional role. The 
Advocate General even went as far as discussing the necessary elements of 
democratic accountability which had to be respected by the ECB, even 
though this kind of accountability was basically reduced to the participation, 
without right to vote, of the President of the Council of the European Union 
and of the accountability owned to the European Parliament in the form of 
reports and questioning before the latter’s committees.89 However, the deci-
sion occurred at the outset of the governance of the Eurozone and is still far 
removed from the first signs of the incipient economic and financial crises.90 
What might have seemed an assertion of judicial activism and a defeat for 
the ECB was reverted a few years later when the ECJ had to decide on ECB’s 
competences in a global context where the functions of central banking were 
again being discussed. 
III. PRINGLE: FROM RULE-BASED TO POLICY-BASED GOVERNANCE 
Crucial to the understanding of the new challenges faced by the ECJ is 
the change in central banking practices and thinking that occurred after the 
2008 Euro Crisis.91 Fear of catastrophic meltdown from contagious debts 
drew central banks, directly or indirectly, into monetizing public debt.92 Both 
the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank resorted to programs 
of quantitative easing.93 “They sought to inject liquidity and to reduce long-
term interest rates by purchasing government bonds.”94 The Bank of England, 
for example, acquired government bonds up to almost 10 percent of GDP.95 
The ECB was facing the same type of systemic pressure but in a com-
pletely different constitutional and administrative system.96 The self-percep-
tion of the role of the ECB partially changed as a reaction to the crisis, but its 
  
 88 Goebel, supra note 28, at 642–43. 
 89 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Cent. Bank, 2003 E.C.R. at I-7203; Goebel, su-
pra note 28, at 639.  
 90 See HOWARD DAVIES & DAVID GREEN, BANKING ON THE FUTURE: THE FALL AND RISE OF 
CENTRAL BANKING 1 (2010).  
 91 Id. at 52. 
 92 KENNETH DYSON, STATES, DEBT, AND POWER: ‘SAINTS’ AND ‘SINNERS’ IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 
AND INTEGRATION 386 (2014).  
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id.  
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activities had to find a way to ground legitimacy and legality in the Treaties.97 
The ECB proceeded by stealth in re-financing both national banking systems 
and governments through enhanced credit provisions to banks.98 Further-
more, in order to stabilize market expectations, the ECB, during the years 
2011-2012, embraced a new role, committing itself to unlimited, but condi-
tional, intervention in sovereign bond secondary markets, despite the strong 
and public opposition of the Bundesbank.99 Starting in May 2010, the ECB 
agreed to limited sovereign bond purchases as part of the larger Eurozone 
bail-out package, raising many concerns in terms of the legality and long-
term consequences of this move.100 It also agreed to be an active part of the 
new economic governance of the Eurozone, by taking part in the oversight 
of institutions introduced by the European Stability Mechanism (“ESM”) and 
acting as the site for the Single Supervisory Mechanism at the heart of the 
projected European banking union.101 Finally, after having abandoned the 
temporary and circumscribed project of limited buying on the secondary mar-
kets of bonds issued by debtor States, the ECB launched the infamous Out-
right Monetary Transactions (“OMT”) program, on which more will be said 
in the following section.102 All these new instruments conjure up a substantial 
transformation of the role of the ECB and a change of the constitutional bal-
ance within the EU.103  
By now, the legitimacy of the ECB’s position in the Euro crisis has been 
judicially tested twice.104 In 2012, the first seminal case, Pringle,105 was 
brought before the ECJ by a preliminary reference coming from the Irish Su-
preme Court. In Pringle, the ECJ was asked to assess the legality of the newly 
introduced ESM.106 The Irish Supreme Court decided to make a reference for 
a preliminary ruling to the ECJ, asking whether the ESM was compatible 
with several provisions of the EU Treaties.107 The ECJ, sitting in full with its 
  
 97 See e.g., Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, Speech at the German Federal 
Ministry of Finance (Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120419. 
en.html. 
 98 HINAREJOS, supra note 25, at 20.  
 99 DYSON, supra note 92, at 384.  
 100 Id. at 386.  
 101 Id. at 384, 387.  
 102 For a more detailed reconstruction of the unfolding of the Euro crisis and the role played by the 
ECB, see HINAREJOS, supra note 25, at 21; see also infra text accompanying notes 126–130. 
 103 On changes caused by the response to the crisis in the EU, see THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
EUROPEAN BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS, (Maurice Adams, Federico Fabbrini & P. Larouche eds., (2014); 
Mark Dawson & Floris de Witte, Constitutional Balance in the EU After the Euro-Crisis, 76 MOD. L. 
REV. 817 (2013). 
 104 See Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, EU:C:2015:7; Case C-370/12, Pringle v. 
Gov’t of Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756.  
 105 Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, ¶ 28.  
 106 Id.  
 107 Id.  
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27 judges—a rare event—rejected all challenges and upheld the ESM in all 
its aspects.108 
For purposes of this article, only some of the aspects addressed in Prin-
gle are directly relevant. First, the case signalled the new deference adopted 
by the ECJ in issues related to the economic and financial crises.109 While on 
other topics the ECJ has always been rather assertive, in this field it has 
shown a remarkable level of deference.110 Crucially, the ECJ adopted in this 
case a purposeful and teleological reading of the no-bail clause in Article 125 
of the TFEU.111 According to the ECJ, this Article has two aims: first, to en-
courage prudent budgetary policy in the Member States by ensuring that they 
remain responsible to their creditors;112 and second, to safeguard the financial 
stability of the Euro area as a whole.113 The ECJ introduced a new rationale 
for the governance of the Eurozone, one which did not have any explicit 
recognition in the Treaties.114 In the case of the ESM, the instrument was 
necessary to safeguard the financial stability of the Eurozone, and because it 
was attached to conditionality, it was not in violation of the no bail-out 
clause.115  
A second important point, which concerns the ECB more directly, is 
dictated by the use of EU institutions outside the context of EU law.116 The 
ESM and the Fiscal Treaty have been approved not as part of EU law, but as 
international treaties coming out of intergovernmental decisions.117 The 
Court concluded that the allocation of tasks to EU institutions outside the 
framework of EU law was not problematic, at least as long as it was affecting 
an area of exclusive EU competence.118 Note, incidentally, that this recogni-
tion may imply the non-applicability of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights to actions taken by EU institutions outside of the framework of EU 
  
 108 Id. ¶ 186. 
 109 Id.; Takis Tridimas & Napoleon Xanthoulis, A Legal Analysis of the Gauweiler Case: Between 
Monetary Policy and Constitutional Conflict, 23 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 17, 32–33 (2016) (dis-
cussing the impact of the Pringle decision on the later Gauweiler case).  
 110 See id. at 31.  
 111 On the Court’s legal reasoning in Pringle, see Paul Craig, Pringle: Legal Reasoning, Text, Pur-
pose and Teleology, 20 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 3, 7 (2013).  
 112 Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, ¶ 135–36.  
 113 Id. ¶ 136.   
 114 See, e.g., Ciara Murphy, Pringle–The Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Conundrum, 
EUR. L. BLOG (Dec. 6 2012), http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=1305.  
 115 Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, ¶ 142.  
 116 Id. ¶ 93.   
 117 Q&A: EU Fiscal Treaty to Control Eurozone Budgets, BBC (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www. 
bbc.com/news/world-europe-16057252. 
 118 Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, ¶¶ 158–68. 
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law.119 The ECB’s function in the governance of the Euro would be sanc-
tioned, from now on, as an exercise first in crisis management, for which no 
rules were foreseen, and then in policy making.120 In other words, the ECJ’s 
purposeful reasoning in Pringle paved the way for the formal recognition of 
an informal transformation.121 The governance of the Eurozone would still be 
left in the hands of technocratic bodies, but now with an overtly discretionary 
and rather political function to perform.122 Once this transformation was pub-
licly ratified by the ECJ, it was only a matter of time before a new challenge, 
concerning the changed nature of the EMU’s and of the role of the ECB’s 
would be presented to the ECJ. 
IV. GAUWEILER: DOES PROPORTIONALITY TRUMP THE RULE OF LAW? 
The background which led to Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag,123 the 
most important decision on the role of the ECB, must be quickly summarized 
for a proper understanding of both the major shift in the constitutional bal-
ance of the EU and of what is properly at stake in the case. In 2012, doubts 
about the future of the euro were still rampant and the cost of borrowing 
money for some Member States had increased alarmingly in the previous 
year, particularly in Spain, Italy, and Greece.124 In the middle of this crisis, 
the president of the ECB, Mario Draghi, announced that “the ECB is ready 
to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro,” adding, famously, “[a]nd be-
lieve me, it will be enough.”125  
One month later, at a press conference, after a meeting of the ECB’s 
Governing Council, President Draghi announced to the public the decision to 
  
 119 Margot E. Salomon, Of Austerity, Human Rights and International Institutions, 21 EUR. L.J. 521, 
534 (2015) (“One unresolved issue of key importance is the possibility that EU institutions could do out-
side of the EU that which they could not do within the EU—disregard the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
in the exercise of their tasks. The Court, for its part, left open whether the EU institutions—the EC and 
the ECB – can be bound by the Charter in relation to their conduct under the ESM.”) (footnote omitted). 
 120 See Jörg Bibow, The Euro’s Savior? Assessing the ECB’s Crisis Management Performance and 
Potential for Crisis Resolution, 42 IMK STUDIES (Institut für Makroökonomie und Konjunkturforschung, 
Dusseldorf, Germany), June 2015, at 55–56, http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/ 
p_imk_study_42_2015.pdf. 
 121 See id. at 23–24. 
 122 See id. 
 123 Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, http://eur-lex.eu-
ropa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62014CJ0062&from=EN.  
 124 See, e.g., Jack Ewing, The Euro Zone Crisis: A Primer, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (May 22, 2012), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/the-euro-zone-crisis-a-primer. 
 125 Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, Speech at the Global Investment Confer-
ence in London (July 26, 2012), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726. 
en.html. 
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conduct the OMT program and gave some details.126 In its statement, the ECB 
declared that it was ready to purchase secondary-market government bonds 
issued by Member States of the Eurozone, subject to certain conditions: first, 
states concerned had to be subject to financial assistance, by either the Euro-
pean Financial Stability Facility (“EFSF”) or the ESM; second, no quantita-
tive limits for the amount of purchases of these bonds were announced; third, 
the ECB would act in the same way as any private creditors and therefore 
would not benefit from a special status as public actor.127 Following the an-
nouncement, the volatility of the interest rates paced down, the OMT pro-
gram has never been activated, and the program itself has now been over-
come by a new project of “quantitative easing” defined as the Asset Purchase 
Program (“APP”), a staggering 60 billion euros per month program through 
which government bonds are purchased on secondary markets.128  
It is this background through which the question about the legality of 
the OMT emerged and, extraordinarily, through which the first preliminary 
reference ever sent from the German Federal Constitutional Court (“FCC”) 
was raised. The FCC basically asked the ECJ whether the ECB overstepped 
its powers relating primarily to monetary policy: did the ECB act ultra vires 
in venturing into economic policy?129 More specifically, the FCC, in its ref-
erence, raises the question whether the OMT program, rather than being a 
monetary policy measure under Article 18 protocol and Art. 119 TFEU, is in 
fact an economic policy measure, which would be outside the jurisdiction of 
the ECB.130 
Predictably, both the Advocate General and the ECJ decided in favour 
of the legality of the OMT program.131 The unsurprising character of the de-
cision is not solidly grounded in legal reasoning or in natural deference. After 
Pringle, one could foresee that the ECJ had bought into the narrative, which 
links the trajectory of the single currency to the survival of the EU as such: 
  
 126 See Press Conference, Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, (Sept. 6, 2012), 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120906.en.html. 
 127 Press Release, European Central Bank, Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions 
(Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html [hereinafter 
OMT Press Release]. 
 128 Vestert Borger, Outright Monetary Transactions and the Stability Mandate of the ECB: Gau-
weiler, 53 COMMON. L REV. 139, 148 (2016) (“Until now the ECB has never had to use the OMT pro-
gramme.”); Expanded Asset Purchase Programme, EUR. CENT. BANK, https://www.ecb.europa. 
eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). 
 129 Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, ¶¶ 5–8, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62014CJ0062&from =EN. 
 130 Id. ¶ 10. 
 131 Id. ¶ 127; Opinion of Advocate General Cruz-Villalón, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, Case 
C-62/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:7, ¶ 263, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= 
CELEX:62014CC0062&from=EN. 
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no euro, no EU.132 The case also tested the boundaries of what is admissible 
as res judicada before the ECJ.133 In fact, the ECJ thought that it had juris-
diction over the communication of the ECB, which is something not auto-
matically out of doubt.134 After all, no future binding legal act had been per-
formed by the ECB and the communication in itself did not have a manifest 
legal nature.135 But the ECJ thought that in the context of regulation of mon-
etary policy, the circulation of information matters and the ECB, as European 
agency, has the explicit legal obligation to communicate widely and trans-
parently.136 The ECJ maintained that this would be enough to make the ECB 
communicative act legally reviewable under the same criteria of a formal 
act.137  
Beyond the jurisdictional question, there is a lot to be said about this 
decision.138 Gauweiler represents the most prominent case in the definition 
of the limits of judicial review of central banking. It is part and parcel of the 
sui generis nature of the European constitutional order that a nearly hypo-
thetical question essentially of administrative law nature about the potential 
action of an independent agency might trigger such a heated confrontation 
between the German constitutional court and the ECJ.139 But, as shall be 
shown, it is also the certification of a transformation in the nature of the func-
tion of central banking. In light of the previous history of confrontations, this 
judicial dialogue has the potential of triggering an authentic constitutional 
conflict between the two most powerful European courts.140  
Yet, this issue, as important as it is in the identification of the legal value 
of EU law (in the hierarchy of legal sources), won’t be discussed in this arti-
cle. The focus is rather on two other points: first, the transformation of the 
  
 132 Gauweiler, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, ¶¶ 59–61 (noting that the EU would not survive if national 
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 134 See Gauweiler, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, ¶¶ 6, 121. 
 135 Id. ¶ 6; see also OMT Press Release, supra note 127. 
 136 Gauweiler, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, ¶ 82–87. 
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tary Union, 11 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 563 (2015).  
 139 Fabbrini, supra note 138, at 1004–05. 
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structure of governance in the Eurozone; and second, the limited judicial ca-
pacity of holding the ECB to account for its policies.  
The two aspects are sides of the same coin: the new policy-oriented gov-
ernance of the Eurozone requires stronger forms of accountability and in par-
ticular of political responsibility. This two-fold argumentation is reflected in 
the structure of the ECJ’s judgment. In fact, after having established that the 
press release of the Governing Council of the ECB was subject to judicial 
review, the ECJ engaged first with the legal basis of the ECB’s action.141  
The key provision here is Article 126 TFEU, which prohibits excessive 
government deficits.142 In the realm of public expenditures, the competence 
of the ECB is strictly circumscribed by the prohibition of monetary financing 
of Member State debt by means of direct purchase of government bonds.143 
In an analysis of the distinction between economic and monetary policy, the 
Court held that “in order to determine whether a measure falls within the area 
of monetary policy” it was necessary to assess the objectives and the instru-
ment used.144  
According to the Court, the OMT program certainly fell within the 
scope of the ECB monetary policy.145 The core of the ECJ’s argument re-
volves around the point made by the ECB itself: the OMT aimed “to safe-
guard both an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness 
of the monetary policy.”146 The ECB based its argument for constructing an 
expanded role in its need to act to secure the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism by preventing financial fragmentation in the form of widely dif-
ferent interest rates in Member States: Appropriate “monetary policy trans-
mission” cannot be granted in presence of massive spreads among national 
bonds.147 Concerning the instrument used, the ECB Statute granted to the 
ECB the power to conduct transactions on the secondary markets. While 
OMT may “to some extent, further the economic policy objectives” of ad-
justment programs, “such indirect effects do not mean that such a program 
must be treated as equivalent to an economic policy measure, since it is ap-
parent from Articles 119(2) TFEU, 127(1) TFEU and 282(2) TFEU that, 
without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ECSB is to support 
the general economic policies in the [EU].”148 
The Court reads the prohibition contained in Article 123 TFEU against 
the background of the conditionality imposed by ESFS or ESM programs.149 
  
 141 See Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, ¶¶ 27–28, 31–33; 
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Here, the shift is clear: what is essential in order to determine the legality of 
the ECB’s OMT program is that it does not lessen the impetus of the Member 
States to follow a sound budgetary policy.150  
A large part of the Court’s reasoning is then devoted, in classic fashion, 
to proportionality review of the program. In accordance with the Advocate 
General’s advice,151 the ECJ acknowledged that because the ECB is supposed 
“to make choices of a technical nature and to undertake forecasts and com-
plex assessments, it must be allowed, in that context, a broad discretion.”152 
The question, at this stage, obviously concerns how to harness such discre-
tion in a way which remains compatible with the rule of law. The ECJ sug-
gests a procedural test of proportionality in order to check the legality of the 
ECB’s discretion.153 As for what concerns the suitability step of proportion-
ality review, the Court held that “it does not appear that that analysis of the 
economic situation of the euro area as at the date of the announcement of the 
program in question is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment.”154 The 
point of technical expertise is again conjured up at this point:  
[G]iven that questions of monetary policy are usually of a controversial nature and 
in view of the ESCB’s broad discretion, nothing more can be required of the ESCB 
apart from that it uses its economic expertise and the necessary technical means at 
its disposal to carry out that analysis with all care and accuracy.155 
As for the second step of proportionality review, the necessity of the 
OMT program, the ECJ ruled the action of the ECB did “not go manifestly 
beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives.”156 The ECB had the 
expertise to decide if and when a bond-buying program may prove necessary 
in order to avoid the disruption of the monetary policy transmission.157 How-
ever, given that it is impossible to establish in advance how long will it take 
to support a Member State’s bonds on the markets,158 it seems that the neces-
sity of the program and the absence of possible alternatives have not been 
fully appreciated by the ECJ. 
  
 150 See id. ¶ 120 (“The fact that the purchase of government bonds is conditional upon full compli-
ance with the structural adjustment programs to which the Member States concerned are subject precludes 
the possibility of a program, such as that announced in the press release, acting as an incentive to those 
States to dispense with fiscal consolidation, relying on the financing opportunities to which the imple-
mentation of such a program could give rise.”). 
 151 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz-Villalón, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, Case C-62/14, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:7, ¶ 111. 
 152 Gauweiler, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, ¶ 68. 
 153 Id. ¶ 66. 
 154 Id. ¶ 74. 
 155 Id. ¶ 75. 
 156 Id. ¶ 81. 
 157 See Gauweiler, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, ¶ 89. 
 158 But see id. ¶ 87–88; Opinion of Advocate General Cruz-Villalón, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bun-
destag, Case C-62/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:7, ¶ 179. 
614 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 24:595 
Finally, the Court seems completely unconcerned that the ECB is in-
volved both as monetary broker in its role as Europe’s central bank and fiscal 
enforcer through its part in the Troika’s adjustment programs.159 On this 
point, the ECJ ignored the Opinion of the Advocate General.160 According to 
the latter, the double role of the ECB as part of a supervising body within a 
framework for financial assistance and in its bond-buying role in the OMT 
program would blur the attribution of functions of the ECB.161 The Advocate 
General, in case of the activation of the OMT program, deemed necessary 
that the ECB ought to distance itself from the Troika immediately.162 How-
ever, the Court failed to mention this important point. As noted by a scholar, 
in this way  
The ECB would thus come to wield enormous power over a Member State that 
found itself in a situation of requesting assistance—with the ECB then setting mon-
etary policy as well as negotiating economic policy and monitoring compliance with 
adjustment programs to the level of detail where it is dictating the opening hours of 
bakeries.163  
In conclusion, the decision seems to grant a wide margin of discretion 
to the ECB when it comes to deciding monetary policies. As remarked by the 
Advocate General Cruz Villalón, to exercise this task the ECB has at its dis-
posal technical expertise and access to crucial information which allows it to 
devise monetary policies.164 Coupled with an extensive use of proportionality 
analysis, such an approach gives a great margin of discretion to the ECB, 
given that no one can anticipate what will be necessary to do in order to sta-
bilize the monetary transmission and hence to secure the singleness of the 
currency.165  
The measure of discretion granted to the ECB is not only beyond the 
reach of substantive judicial review and the application of EU fundamental 
rights.166 It is so wide that it has assumed a political dimension, because it is 
capable of determining the trajectory of political aims in countries of the Eu-
rozone (i.e., the debtor countries).167 In fact, the Governing Council of the 
  
 159 Wilkinson, supra note 140, at 1058. 
 160 Compare Opinion of Advocate General Cruz-Villalón, Gauweiler, ECLI:EU:C:2015:7, ¶¶ 142–
43 with Gauweiler, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, ¶¶ 58, 60; see also Wilkinson, supra note 140, at 1058. 
 161 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz-Villalón, Gauweiler, ECLI:EU:C:2015:7, ¶¶ 248–50. 
 162 Id. ¶ 150. The Troika is the triad of institutions (the ECB, the International Monetary Fund, the 
European Commission) that are in charge of overseeing the application of austerity programs. 
 163 Wilkinson, supra note 140, at 1058. 
 164 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz-Villalón, Gauweiler, ECLI:EU:C:2015:7, ¶¶ 110–11, 151. 
 165 Id. ¶¶ 186–87.  
 166 See Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Gov’t of Ireland, ECLI:EU:2012:756, ¶¶ 178–82.  
 167 See Gauweiler, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, ¶¶ 76, 78, 89; Smits, supra note 52, at 1175. 
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ECB is not only entitled to decide interest rates, but actually to steer the po-
litical trajectory of monetary policies and to oversee fiscal and financial ca-
pacities of debtor Member States.168 
In a nutshell, the ECJ has rubberstamped the entrenchment of a political 
role for an independent agency such as the ECB. What is possibly the most 
independent central bank in the world has now become a political player in 
the Eurozone. It is fair to note that it was not possible to demand from the 
ECJ an extremely activist attitude because “[t]here is indeed reason to exer-
cise a degree of judicial restraint when scrutinising the [ECB]’s policy deci-
sions, given its nature as an expert body and the independence granted to it 
by the Treaties.”169 However, remaining within a strict understanding of its 
competences, the ECJ could have openly discussed whether the independ-
ence and the expertise of the ECB are tainted by its participation under dif-
ferent guises in the new economic governance or applied a more demanding 
proportionality test. 
V. THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Pringle and Gauweiler show that there has been a shift in the govern-
ance of the single euro currency. The question of the respect of competences 
by the ECB’s Press Release was addressed starting from this assumption, 
which remains unscrutinised and taken for granted as if it were not problem-
atic for the principle of the rule of law. Even the claim that the measures 
adopted to cope with the Euro crisis are based on the logic of the emergency 
is never fully questioned, whereas it has become evident, at least by now, that 
the bulk of the new economic governance of the Euro and of the new policies 
adopted by the ECB and the Eurogroup are here to stay.170  
Whether the rule of law had been violated required a stricter scrutiny 
than the one applied by the ECJ. These limits of judicial review are a conse-
quence of using a flattening and weak device like a procedural understanding 
of the proportionality test for cases where even the first step of proportional-
ity analysis, the legitimacy of the aim of the measure under review, deserved 
a deeper analysis than what is usually granted.171 
The ECJ has avoided both confronting the political implications of mon-
etary policy in the suboptimal currency and facing the consequences deriving 
  
 168 EUR. CENT. BANK, GOVERNING COUNCIL (2016), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/deci-
sions/govc/html/index.en.html; Heisbourg, supra note 40, at 28–29. 
 169 Hinarejos, supra note 138, at 575 (footnote omitted_. 
 170 Cf. Jonathan White, Emergency Europe, 63 POL. STUD. 300, 301 (2013). 
 171 For a reconstruction of the different forms of proportionality review, usually determined by the 
relevant constitutional culture, see AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND 
THEIR LIMITATIONS (2012); JACCO BOMHOFF, BALANCING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE ORIGINS AND 
MEANINGS OF POSTWAR LEGAL DISCOURSE (2013); and, in the European context, the classic ROBERT 
ALEXY, A THEORY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (Julian Rivers, trans., 2010). 
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from the new constitutional function granted to the ECB.172 Some commen-
tators have praised the new approach adopted by the ECJ, mostly in light of 
its prudential stance and the creativity of its reasoning.173 But, as it has been 
remarked, while the ECJ has played a crucial role in shaping European inte-
gration, “in relation to post-crisis developments that have affected the nature 
of EMU deeply . . . the Court has tended to take a back seat to the political, 
often intergovernmental, process.”174 One wonders whether such an extreme 
deferential attitude was necessary and what will be the consequences.  
It is clear, however, that the twist given to legal accountability of the 
ECB by the Court’s case law has by now proven to be largely insufficient. 
The failures of holding the ECB accountable and in signalling to the other 
European institutions—and in this way to the wider public—certain potential 
issues arising out of the OMT litigation represent one of the weakest mo-
ments in the ECJ’s history. This decision is a missed opportunity for flagging 
questions concerning the constitutional function exercised de facto by the 
ECB, at least in the Eurozone. The rule of law and the political quality of 
central banking decisions have been sacrificed to the altar of the single cur-
rency. Once assumed that this bargain may be effective, and this is far from 
being certain, it will remain to be seen whether it is worthwhile.175  
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